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IN THE SUPREME COURT IN AND FOR 
THE STATE OF UTAH 
DEBRA KING, et. al., 
Plaintiff and Appellant 
vs. 
DORAN V. PORTER, M.D., and 
SEARLE PHARMACEUTICALS, INC., 
a foreign corporation, 
Defendants and Appellees. 
Case No. 880214 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION 
The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction in this 
matter pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 78-2-2(3)(i) which 
grants jurisdiction to the Supreme Court for appeals from 
final judgments or orders in civil matters. The summary 
judgment from which Plaintiff appeals has been certified as 
final for purposes of appeal pursuant to RCP 54(b). 
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NATURE OF PROCEEDING 
Debra King appeals from a summary judgment entered in 
favor of Searle Pharmaceuticals on the 27th day of January, 
1988. The judgment was certified as final for purposes of 
appeal by the Honorable Judge Cullen Y. Christensen, on the 
6th day of May, 1988. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE ON APPEAL 
Did the district court err in determining the degree of 
causal proof required to establish a prima facie case as to 
Searle Pharmaceuticals? 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATE STATUTES 
No constitutional provisions or state statutes are 
believed to be determinative of the issues on appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE. 
This is an appeal from a summary judgment entered in 
favor of Defendant-respondent Searle Pharmaceuticals, Inc. 
("Searle"). The decision to grant Searle's Motion for 
Summary Judgment was based upon the District Court's 
determination that Appellant Debra King ("King") had failed 
to make a prima facie case of negligence against Searle in 
that King had failed to prove Searle!s product had harmed 
her. (R. 459) 
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B. COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS. 
Debra and Curtis King, husband and wife, filed 
Complaint in the Fourth District Court of Utah County on the 
12th day of August, 1985. Their Complaint was based upon 
damages each had suffered subsequent to the implantation into 
Debra King's uterus of an intrauterine contraceptive device 
(IUD) known as the flCu-7lf. The Complaint alleged medical 
malpractice on the part of Doran V. Porter, M.D., and/or 
negligence on the part of Searle in the design, manufacture, 
and marketing of the Cu-7. Curtis King's claim was later 
dismissed pursuant to a partial summary judgment. 
On May 8, 1987, the District Court entered a Scheduling 
Order which required King to designate expert witnesses by 
July 1, 1987. Shortly prior to that date, King discovered 
that the expert witness upon whom she had planned to rely 
would no longer be available to testify upon her behalf. As 
a consequence, she was unable to designate an expert by the 
date designated. Both Searle and Porter filed Motions for 
Summary Judgment, arguing that without an expert to testify 
on her behalf, King could not make a prima facie case against 
either defendant. 
In support of its Motion for Summary Judgment, Searle 
filed the affidavit of Dr. Howard G. McQuarrie, who stated 
that the Cu-7 was not defective or unreasonably dangerous, 
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and King's injury was not caused as a result of a defect in 
the Cu-7. (R. 207, para. 4 and 5) 
On August 13, 1987, King filed a Motion for Extension of 
Time in Which to Answer Defendants1 Motions for Summary 
Judgment. King informed the court that she had been 
abandoned by her expert, but had been successful in 
obtaining substitute expert assistance. She requested 
additional time in which to document her experts1 opinions so 
as to properly respond to Searlefs motion. In separate 
Rulings, the Court, on August 27, 1987, granted King's 
Motion for Extension of Time as to Defendant Porter, but 
denied the Motion as to Defendant Searle. The Court then 
ruled in favor of Searle!s Motion for Summary Judgment upon 
the grounds that King had still not identified the expert 
upon whom she intended to rely, and had not represented that 
the expert would, in fact, substantiate her claim of 
negligence as to Searle. The Court did not, however, enter 
the order of Summary Judgment upon that date. 
In response to the Court's decision, King filed a 
Request for Relief from Judgment or Order pursuant to URCP 
60(b) arguing that her failure to designate an expert was the 
result of mistake and excusable neglect, and that, while 
some sanction or penalty may have been appropriate for her 
failure to comply with the scheduling order, summary judgment 
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was not. With the Request for Relief, King filed the 
designation of her expert witnesses and the Affidavit of 
Robert Baier, Ph.D., who stated that the copper contained in 
the Cu-7 caused uterine perforation and that this effect made 
the device defective and unreasonably dangerous. Dr. Baier 
expressed the opinion that the device was unsuitable for use. 
(R. 370) Oral arguments were heard as to King's Request for 
Relief from Judgment on January 15, 1988. 
C. DISPOSITION IN DISTRICT COURT 
The District Court, after fully considering the 
affidavit of King's expert, Robert Baier, Ph.D., ruled that 
the affidavit and other pleadings on file were insufficient 
to create a prima facie case as to Searle. Specifically, the 
court ruled that Dr. Baier had not stated that the Cu-7 was 
the cause of Debra King's injuries, and that the affidavit 
was defective because Dr. Baier had not examined Debra King's 
medical records. (R. 457-561) Upon that basis, the court 
entered both the Summary Judgment in favor of Searle 
Pharmaceuticals (R. 454) and an Order denying Plaintiff's 
Request for Relief from Judgment. (R. 452) On May 6, 1988, 
the District Court certified the summary judgment as final 
for purposes of appeal (R. 495) and Notice of Appeal was 
filed by King on June 2, 1988. (R. 502) 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On January 17, 1983, Dr. Doran Porter inserted an 
intrauterine contraceptive device known as the Cu-7 into the 
uterus of Debra King. The device had been designed, 
manufactured, and marketed by Searle Pharmaceuticals, Inc. 
(R. 2, Complaint para. 6; R. 25, Searle Answer para. 4 and 
5). Two weeks after insertion, Dr. Porter performed a 
follow-up examination, and noted that the IUD was in 
"satisfactory position". (R. 510, page 30). 
Approximately one and a half months later, a pregnancy 
test showed King to be pregnant, and the Cu-7 could not be 
located. (R. 510, page 37). King was admitted to the 
hospital, where Dr. Porter again attempted to find and 
remove the device. He was unable to locate the device within 
the uterus. (R. 510, page 46). 
On, or about May 11, 1983, King suffered a spontaneous 
abortion. She was admitted to the hospital for removal of 
the Cu-7 and any remaining products of conception. During an 
exploratory laparoscopy the IUD was finally located outside 
the uterus, lodged in the abdomen. (R. 25, para. 5; R. 510, 
page 57. 62). 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Debra King was injured due to the negligence of one or 
the other of two defendants. Due to the circumstances under 
which she was injured, it is impossible to prove an absolute 
causal connection between the act of a specific defendant and 
the harm incurred. 
The District Court held that King had failed to make a 
prima facie case as to Searle, because her expert witness had 
not stated that Searle!s conduct was the cause-in-fact of the 
harm to her. Under the facts of this case, to require 
direct proof of causation places an impossible and unfair 
burden upon the appellant. The law permits causation to be 
demonstrated by other means. 
The circumstances of the case permit the application of 
res ipsa loquitur. Res ipsa allows a plaintiff, in lieu of 
linking her injury to a specific act, to causally connect it 
with the instrumentality which caused the injury. King's 
burden pursuant to that doctrine was to show that the Cu-7, 
while under the exclusive control of the defendants, had 
caused injury to her; and that, in the absence of 
negligence, the injury should not have occurred. 
As a second avenue of proof, King is permitted to 
demonstrate evidence of "exclusive factual connections" that 
will support an inference of causal negligence. The 
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affidavit of King's expert demonstrates that the Cu-7 is an 
unreasonably dangerous device due to a defect which causes 
it to perforate the uterus. King's injury was consistent 
with the predicted behavior of the device. This evidence 
supports an implication of negligence upon the part of Searle 
pursuant to the doctrine of strict products liability, which 
imposes liability for injuries caused by an unreasonably 
dangerous product. 
The evidence before the court, which must be construed 
in the light most favorable to King, establishes sufficient 
exclusive factual connections between the conduct of Searle 
Pharmaceuticals and the injury incurred by King to create an 
inference of negligence upon the part of Searle. Thus a 
material issue of fact as to causation was before the Court, 
and summary judgment should not have been granted. 
ARGUMENT 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THAT EXPERT TESTIMONY 
WAS REQUIRED AS TO CAUSATION IN ORDER TO ESTABLISH A PRIMA 
FACIE CASE AS TO DEFENDANT SEARLE 
Debra King was injured when an intrauterine 
contraceptive device (IUD) known as the Cu-7 perforated her 
uterus. This injury has been conceded from the outset. Both 
Searle and Dr. Porter acknowledge that the device perforated 
and migrated. (R. 17, Porter Answer, para. 7; R. 25, Searle 
Answer, para. 5) 
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The only evidence before the Court suggests that the 
device perforated in one of two ways: (l) Either Dr. Porter 
pushed the device through the uterine wall upon insertion; or 
(2) some defect inherent within the device itself caused the 
Cu-7 to perforate. Either Dr. Porter's act caused the injury 
to King or the act of Searle Pharmaceuticals in marketing a 
defective product caused the injury. It is impossible to 
scientifically prove, however, which specific event caused 
the injury. Dr. Porter was actually able to visualize both 
the IUD and the uterus during the operative procedure in 
which the Cu-7 was finally located and removed from King's 
body. (R. 510, page 62). Despite this unique opportunity to 
view the device in situ, Dr. Porter was unable to express an 
opinion as to how the device came to be outside the uterus. 
(R. 510, pages 63, 64). 
There are certain tort claims for which it is 
impossible to demonstrate a direct cause-in-fact 
relationship between a specific act and the injury suffered 
by the plaintiff. Among these claims are those in which the 
acts of two or more defendants may each have operated, 
independently, to cause a particular harm. The case on 
appeal is such a claim. 
The District Court dismissed King's cause of action as 
to Searle because she had not provided expert testimony to 
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show that the defect in the device had caused the injury. 
This was error. In cases similar to that on appeal, the 
courts have permitted the plaintiff to demonstrate causation 
through means other than direct cause-in-fact. 
The U.S. District Court in Utah, in a comprehensive and 
detailed analysis, addressed the difficulty of establishing 
cause-in-fact relationships where multiple tortfeasors may 
each, by independent acts, have caused a particular harm to a 
plaintiff. Allen v. United States, 588 F.Supp. 247 (D. Utah 
1984), reversed and remanded on other grounds, 816 F.2d 1417 
(10th Cir. 1987). Allen quoted from Summers v. Ticef 3 3 
Cal.2d 80, 199 P.2d 1, 4 (1948) to illustrate the obstacle 
posed plaintiff where concurrent acts may each have caused an 
injury: 
The injured party has been placed by defendants in 
the unfair position of pointing to which defendant 
caused the harm. If one can escape the other may 
also and plaintiff is remediless. Ordinarily 
defendants are in a much better position to offer 
evidence to determine which one caused the 
injury.... 
Allen v. United States, id. at 410. 
In dismissing Kingfs claim as to Searle, the District 
Court has, in effect, dismissed that as to Dr. Porter as 
well. For either defendant can simply point to the party 
which has been dismissed, saying that it was the act of the 
other which caused the injury. 
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Must Kingfs claim fail for lack of a cause-in-fact? The 
weight of the law says not. The courts have provided means by 
which liability may be imposed other than by proof of actual 
causation. King has provided evidence of causal culpability 
pursuant to two theories negligence, each of which is 
sufficient to create a prima facie case as to Searle. 
A. APPELLANT HAS MADE A PRIMA FACIE CASE AS TO SEARLE 
PURSUANT TO THE DOCTRINE OF RES IPSA LOQUITUR. 
Res ipsa loquitur is an evidentiary rule that permits an 
inference of negligence on the part of a defendant under 
well-defined circumstances. Kusv v. K-Mart Apparel Fashion 
Corp., 681 P.2d 1232 (Utah 1984). These circumstances are as 
follows: 
(1) [T]hat the accident was of a kind which, in the 
ordinary course of events, would not have happened 
had due care been observed; (2) that the 
plaintiff's own use or operation of the agency or 
instrumentality was not primarily responsible for 
the injury; and (3) that the agency or 
instrumentality causing the injury was under the 
exclusive management or control of the defendant. 
Id. at 1235, quoting Anderton v. Montgomery, 607 P.2d 828, 
833 (Utah 1980). 
The second and third of these elements are easily 
established. It is readily apparent that King did not use or 
operate the Cu-7 so as to cause her injury. The Cu-7 is 
implanted within an internal organ of the body (the uterus) 
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where it acts to prevent conception. (R. 2, para, 6; R. 25, 
para. 4) The situation of the device does not lend itself to 
manipulation by the user. The device requires no active 
participation by the user in order to function. 
It is also apparent that the device was at all times 
within the management or control of one or the other of the 
defendants. Searle admits that it manufactured and marketed 
the Cu-7 (R. 25). Dr. Porter obtained the device from a 
marketing representative employed by Searle. (R. 510, page 
23). It is admitted that Dr. Porter inserted the device (R. 
25). There is no evidence before the court to suggest that 
the device was ever handled or manipulated by anyone other 
than Dr. Porter or agents of Searle Pharmaceuticals. 
It is left, then, for King to prove the first of the 
elements requisite for application of res ipsa—that but for 
the absence of due care, the accident would not have 
happened. It seems a matter within common knowledge and 
experience that a medical device implanted within one organ 
of the body should not be later found within another part of 
the body. Something has gone awry. In similar cases where 
medical devices have been lost in a patient, the courts have 
commented, !l[I]n certain situations, the medical procedure is 
so common or the outcome so affronts our notions of medical 
propriety that expert testimony is not required to establish 
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what would occur in the ordinary course of events. In this 
type of situation the plaintiff can rely on the common 
knowledge and understanding of laymen to establish this 
element [a breach of due care]." Nixdorf v. Hicken, 612 
P.2d 348, 353 (Utah 1980). See also, Kim v. Anderson, 610 
P.2d 1270 (Utah 1980). 
The District Court argued that, even with a showing of 
the elements of res ipsa loquitur, King had an obligation to 
demonstrate a causal link between Searle's act and the injury 
King suffered. (R. 460) In so ruling, the court relied upon 
Robinson v. Intermountain Health Care, 740 P.2d 262 (Utah 
App. 1987). Close examination will reveal that King has met 
the tests for causation as defined by Robinson. 
Robinson quoted from Anderton v. Montgomery, 607 P.2d 
828, 834 (Utah 1980) as follows: 
As in any negligence action, a legally-
recognizable causal link must be established 
between defendants act or omission and 
plaintiff's injury. Absent such a causal 
relationship, defendant's conduct, negligent or 
otherwise gives rise to no liability. Res ipsa 
loquitur does not relieve plaintiff of this 
obligation; rather it permits him, in lieu of 
linking his injury to a specific act on defendant's 
part, to causally connect it with an agency or 
instrumentalitv, under the exclusive control of the 
defendant, functioning in a manner which, under the 
circumstances, would produce no injury absent 
negligence. 
Robinson, id. at 266 (emphasis added). 
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Under the standard defined by the Anderton and Robinson 
courts, the causal connection is linked to the 
instrumentality causing the injury, and not the specific act 
of the defendant. Thus, a causal connection is created from 
the facts, as established above, that (1) King was injured by 
the Cu-7; (2) the Cu-7 was under the exclusive control of the 
defendants, (3) absent negligence, either in design or 
implantation, the Cu-7 should not have perforated King's 
uterus. It is only where these elements are not established 
that the causal connection fails. Expert testimony is not 
required to link King's injury to the instrumentality because 
the fact that the instrumentality did injure King has been 
conceded. 
Debra King has established each of the elements 
necessary to apply res ipsa. Causal connection is supported 
via the elements. Thus King has made a prima facie case as 
to Searle. 
B. APPELLANT HAS MADE A PRIMA FACIE CASE AS TO SEARLE 
PURSUANT TO THE DOCTRINE OF STRICT PRODUCTS LIABILITY 
In 1979, the Utah Supreme Court specifically adopted the 
doctrine of strict products liability. The court quoted the 
language of Section 402A, the Restatement (Second) of Torts 
as follows: 
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(1) One who sells any product in a defective 
condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or 
consumer or to his property is subject to 
liability for physical harm thereby caused to the 
ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if 
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of 
selling such a product, and 
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or 
consumer without substantial change in the 
condition in which it was sold, 
Ernest W. Hahn, Inc. v. Armco Steel Co., 601 P.2d 152, 156 
(Utah 1979). 
In support of her claim that the Cu-7 was in a 
"defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user", 
King caused to be filed the affidavit of Robert Baier, Ph.D. 
who is the director of the Health-Care Instruments and 
Devices Institute at the State University of New York at 
Buffalo (R. 370). The Institute deals with "issues of 
fitness and suitability of various biomedical devices for 
their intended purposes". (R. 334). 
In his affidavit, Dr. Baier stated that pure metallic 
copper such as that contained in the Cu-7 causes tissue 
destruction of "gross magnitude". (R. 371) In animal 
experiments, Dr. Baier observed copper implants cause such 
marked tissue destruction that the implants, within twenty 
days, completely perforated through the surrounding tissue 
and dropped to the floor of the animal's cage. (R. 371). Dr. 
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Baier observed that "the copper implants evoked an intense, 
extensive necrotic, inflammatory and foreign body response in 
the surrounding host tissues," (R. 340) Dr. Baier stated 
that the copper contained in the Cu-7 causes a similar 
reaction within the environment of the female uterus (R. 
371), and "this effect permits the device to perforate the 
uterus and migrate to other parts of the body." Dr. Baier 
concluded that the Cu-7 was "inherently dangerous" and 
"inappropriate for implantation in the female uterus". (R. 
371) . 
Dr. Baierfs opinion was based upon the results of his 
laboratory experiments, his education, training, and general 
knowledge of the subject matter. (R. 335). His opinion 
fully supports Plaintiff's claim that the Cu-7 is defective 
and unreasonably dangerous. 
The District Court faulted Dr. Baierfs affidavit, 
stating that because he was not familiar with Debra King's 
medical records, he could not express an opinion as to the 
cause of her injury. (R. 459) In so doing, the court relied 
upon the case of Martin v. Mott, 744 P.2d 337 (Utah App. 
1987) . The ruling in Martin, however, is irrelevant to the 
case on appeal. 
In Martin the court held that a medical doctor, who 
admitted that he did not know the standard of care required 
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of podiatrists, and was unaware of the treatment received by 
the Plaintiff, could not testify as to whether the podiatrist 
had breached the required standard of care. The medical 
doctor was not familiar with the necessary facts. Jd. at 
339. 
Although Dr. Baier did not examine Debra King's medical 
records, he is clearly in a possession of facts necessary to 
qualify him to render an opinion as to the safety of the 
Cu-7. Dr. Baier does not presume to state categorically that 
the defect in the device was the cause of the perforation. 
That fact, as noted above, is incapable of scientific proof. 
Yet, even without such a categorical statement, Dr. Baierfs 
affidavit supports a causal connection between the defect in 
the Cu-7 and the injury suffered by Plaintiff. 
Allen v. United States, supra p. 10, at 406, quoted from 
Professor E. Wayne Thode's "Tort Analysis: Duty-Risk v. 
Proximate Cause and the Rational Allocation of Functions 
Between Judge and Jury", 1977 Utah Law Rev. 1 at 5, by 
stating: 
If plaintiff cannot establish a cause-in-fact 
connection between his injury and defendant's 
conduct that will support liability,...plaintiff 
should attempt to establish the most exclusive 
factual connection that he can between his injury 
and the defendant. This will normally involve 
some kind of a relationship between plaintiff and 
defendant.... 
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Allen went on to explain: 
The more exclusive the factual connections that may 
be established by evidence, the stronger the 
rational basis for focusing the tools of legal 
analysis upon a specific defendant's conduct. ..That 
the defendant was engaged in risk-creating conduct 
of a particular type, and plaintiff's injuries are 
consistent with the kind of harm that is predicted 
and observed when such risks are created, makes the 
factual connection seem even more exclusive— 
exclusive of other defendants, other connections, 
other "causes". 
Id. at 406, 407. It is readily apparent that the affidavit 
of Dr. Robert Baier provides a strong factual connection 
between the risk-creating conduct of Searle (the marketing of 
a defective product) and the predicted injury (perforation of 
the uterus). Dr. Porter's testimony that the Cu-7 appeared 
to be in proper position two weeks after insertion (R. 510, 
page 3 0) seems to indicate that the device perforated after 
insertion, and tends to make the factual connection even 
more exclusive. 
That fact that Dr. Porter may have caused or 
contributed to King's injuries is not fatal to her position 
as to Searle. In similar cases, where more than one 
defendant may have caused an injury, the burden of proof as 
to actual causation has been shifted to the defendants. 
Allen explained: 
This shift in burden of proof reflects a sound 
application of important legal policies to the 
practical problems of trying a law suit: where a 
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strong factual connection exists between 
defendants conduct and the plaintiff's injury, but 
the selection of "actual" cause-in-fact from among 
several "causes" is problematical, those 
difficulties of proof are shifted to the 
tortfeasor, the wrongdoer, in order to do 
substantial justice between the parties. If direct 
proof of actual cause is to fail, the ultimate 
burden of the injury should fall upon him who was 
negligent and who likely is in a better position to 
inform the court of the facts relating to the case. 
Id. at 411 (footnote omitted). Allen quoted from Section 
432(2) of the Restatement (Second) of Torts: 
If two forces are actively operating, one because 
of the actor's negligence, the other not because of 
any misconduct on his part, and each of itself 
sufficient to bring about harm to another, the 
actorfs negligence may be found to be a substantial 
factor in bringing it about. 
Id. 
The evidence before the court supported an inference of 
causal negligence between the acts of Searle Pharmaceuticals 
and the perforation of King's uterus. That was not the sole 
inference which could be drawn from the evidence—it was also 
suggested that Dr. Porter may have caused the device to 
perforate at the time of insertion. Nevertheless, there was 
significant factual connection established between the defect 
contained in the Cu-7 and the injury suffered by King. This 
connection is sufficient to create a jury question as to 
proximate cause and to support a prima facie case as to 
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Searle pursuant to the doctrine of strict products 
liability. 
CONCLUSION 
Summary judgment may be granted only where the record 
shows there is no genuine issue as to any material fact so 
that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law. URCP 56(c). Proximate cause is generally a fact 
question that is to be resolved by the jury, and only where 
the facts are undisputed may the question be resolved as a 
matter of law. Rees v. Albertsons, Inc., 587 P.2d 130, 133 
(Utah 1978); Apache Tank Lines, Inc. v. Cheney, 706 P.2d 
614, 615 (Utah 1985). "Doubts, uncertainties or inferences 
concerning issues of fact must be construed in a light most 
favorable to the party opposing summary judgment." Mountain 
States, Etc. v. Atkin, Wright & Miles, 681 P.2d 1258, 1261 
(Utah 1984). See also, Bowen v. Riverton City, 656 P.2d 
434, 436 (Utah 1982). 
Appellant demonstrated to the Court that she had 
suffered an injury of a type, which in the absence of 
negligence, she should not have suffered; and that the 
instrumentality which caused the injury was under the 
exclusive control of the defendants. An inference of causal 
negligence, pursuant to the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was 
thereby established. 
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Appellant also provided the court with the affidavit of 
Dr. Robert Baier, which demonstrated a strong factual 
connection between the defect in the Cu-7 and the injury 
suffered by Appellant. This factual connection is sufficient 
to support a claim of negligence as to the Respondent, 
Searle, pursuant to the doctrine of strict products 
liability. 
The inferences which are to be drawn from the evidence 
before the court as to causation, create a material issue of 
fact and support King's claim to Searle under two alternative 
theories of negligence. Thus summary judgment is 
inappropriate. 
Appellant respectfully requests that the Summary 
Judgment in favor of Searle Pharmaceuticals be reversed and 
the case be remanded to the District Court for trial on the 
merits. 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY ' », 
STATE OF UTAH 
DEBRA KING and CURTIS KING, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
DORAN V. PORTER, M.D. and 
SEARLE PHARMACEUTICALS INC., 
a foreign corporation, 
Defendants. 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN 
FAVOR OF 
SEARLE PHARMACEUTICALS INC, 
Civil No. 70,361 
The Motion For Summary Judgment of Searle 
Pharmaceuticals Inc. having been considered by the Court:, 
including the Memorandum of Authorities in support of the 
Motion; the Court being fully advised in the premises and 
having heretofore entered in writing its Ruling on the 
Motion, now enters the following Order: 
1. The Motion For Summary Judgment of Searle 
Pharmaceuticals Inc. is granted. 
9? 
2. The Complaint/1 of the plaintiff Debra King 
against the defendant Searle Pharmaceuticals Inc. is 
dismissed with prejudice. r\ 
DATED this Zj/ day of go^bember , 198£>. 
BY THE COURT: 
Len Y.^Christensen 
District^Court Judge 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
MAILED, postage prepaid, this r^ ff day of 
August, 1987, a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
Summary Judgment In Favor Of Searle Pharmaceuticals, to 
the following: 
Wayne B. Watson 
Terri C. Bingham 
WATSON, SEILER & OREHOSKI 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
2696 North University Avenue 
Suite 220 
Provo, Utah 84604 
David W. Slagle 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys for Defendant Porter 
P. 0. Box 45000 
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 84145 
\jML.t *Zp*jhX; 
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DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY, "'iU'n(^ -^'/-Clf PM 
STATE OF UTAH ' "^ 
Case No. 70361 
RULING 
DEBRA KING, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DORAN V. PORTER, M.D., et al., 
Defendants. 
This matter comes before the Court, under Rule 2.8, 
on the motion of plaintiff seeking relief from the Court's 
Ruling of August 28, 1987 granting a Summary Judgment in 
favor of defendant Searle Pharmaceutical. The Court has 
reviewed the file, considered the memoranda of counsel, 
entertained argument of counsel, and upon being advised 
in the premises, now makes the following: 
RULING 
1. Said motion is denied on the following bases: 
(a) Even though plaintiff has now designated 
her purported expert witness as heretofore ordered by the 
Court and has responded to defendant Searlefs Motion for 
Summary Judgment, such response, which has been fully considered 
by the Court, is, in the opinion of the Court, insufficient 
to forestall Summary Judgment. 
In Hoopiiaina v. IHC, 740 P.2d 270, the Utah 
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Court of Appeals held that: 
"In medical malpractice actions the plaintiff must 
provide expert testimony to establish: 1) the standard 
of care, Marsh v. Pemberton, 10 Utah 2.d 40, 347 P.2d 
1108, 1110 (1959); 2) defendant's failure to comply with 
that standard, Nixdorf v. Hicken, 612 P.2d 348, 351 (Utah 
1980); and 3) that defendant caused plaintiff's injuries. 
Huggins v. Hicken, 6 Utah 2d 233, 310 P.2d 523, 526 (1957). 
Further issues of fact which are outside the knowledge 
and experience of lay persons must be established by expert 
tesitmony. Kim v. Anderson, 610 P.2d 1270, 1271 (Utah 
1980). 
Defendant Searle in support of its Motion Summary 
Judgment submitted the Affidavit of Dr. Howard G. McQuarrie, 
M.D. as an expert who, after reviewing all of the relevant 
medical records and other documents pertaining to plaintiff's 
claims, affirmed as follows: 
ff3. I am familiar with the intrauterine copper contra-
ceptive known as the CU-7, manufactured and distributed 
by Searle Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (Searle). I conducted 
clinical research relating to the CU-7 prior to the approval 
of the same by the United States Food and Drug Adminis-
tration in 1974, which approval continues to this date. 
I have reviewed numerous medical articles, publications 
and reports relating to the CU-7 as well as other intra-
uterine contraceptive devices. I have also used the CU-7 
in connection with my clinical practice. 
If4. Based upon my education, training, experience, 
and upon review of the foregoing documents, it is my 
professional opinion that the CU-7 is an effective contra-
ceptive and is not medically defective and unreasonably 
dangerous and that Searle exercised appropriate judgment 
in connection with the design, testing, manufacturing, and 
marketing of the CU-7; further, the documents provided with 
the CU-7 by Searle gave adequate and appropriate instructions, 
warnings, and other information concerning the CU-7 to 
physicians and patients who utilized the same. 
"5. It is further my professional opinion that the 
complication which developed with respect to the CU-7 which 
-3-
developed with respect to the CU-7 which was inserted into 
the uterus of the plaintiff, Debra King by the defendant 
Doran V. Porter, M.D., was not caused as a result of any 
defective and unreasonably dangerous condition of the CU-7 
or as a result of any negligence or other fault on the 
part of Searle; . . ." 
Plaintiff in a response to said Affidavit has 
filed an Affidavit by Robert E. Baier, Ph.D, as an expert, 
who did not purport to have examined any of the medical 
records in this case and whose experiments with respect to 
the CU-7 were conducted on rabbits, who affirmed as follows: 
"3. It is my opinion that the copper contained in the 
CU-7 intrauterine device has an almost identical effect 
upon the tissues of the human female, and this effect permits 
the device to perforate the uterus and migrate to other 
parts of the body. 
"4. In my opinion the CU-7 is an inherently dangerous 
device inappropriate for implantation in the female uterus/1 
Even assuming for the sake of argument that the 
Baier Affidavit raises a genuine issue of fact as to plaintiff's 
claim that the CU-7 is "inherently dangerous,M an assumption 
which the case of Martin v. Mott, 68 Ut. Adv. Rep. 33, 
would belie because of the unfamiliarity of Baier with the 
records in the case, such affidavit does not, nor has 
plaintiff through any other means attempted to establish 
through credible evidence that the CU-7 caused any injury 
or damage to the plaintiff. Plaintiff has thus failed to 
make out a prima facie case against defendant Searle. 
In Hoopiiaina, supra, the Court of Appeals noted 
that expert testimony was necessary to establish the fact 
that the conduct of the defendant caused plaintiff harm 
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and stated: 
flIn the absence of an expert to testify for plaintiff 
that the quinidine harmed him, the court correctly concluded 
that the jury would have no evidence upon which to base 
a finding that the quinidine caused any harm to plaintiff. 
. . . Thus, no genuine disputes of material fact existed 
to preclude granting the motion for summary judgment.11 
Plaintiff asserted in oral argument that in any event the 
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is prima facie applicable so 
as to preclude summary judgment. That doctrine may in 
unusual circumstances be permitted to carry the burden of 
establishing a duty of reasonable care owed by the defendant 
to the plaintiff and a breach of that duty. It is an 
evidentiary doctrine aiding in the proof of negligence; 
it has no bearing on the issue of causation, which must be 
separately and independently established. This was so held 
in Robinson v. IHC, 62 Ut. Adv. Rep. 21. The Robinson 
Court further quoted from Anderton v. Montgomery, 607 P. 2d 
828 as follows: 
MAs in any negligence action, a legally-recognizable 
causal link must be established between defendant's act or 
omission and plaintiff's injury. Absent such a causal 
relationship, defendant's conduct, negligent or otherwise, 
gives rise to no liability. Res Ipsa loquitur does not 
relieve plaintiff of this obligation; rather, it permits 
him, in lieu of linking his injury to a specific act on 
defendant's part, to causally connect it with an agency or 
instrumentality, under the exclusive control of the defen-
dant, functioning in a manner which, under the circumstances, 
would produce no injury absent negligence. However, where 
the agency or instrumentality is not established to be the 
cause of plaintiff's injury, or where it is not shown to be 
under the exclusive control of the defendant, the causal 
connection is not established, and the inference of negligent 
conduct giving rise thereto is nullified." 
This Court is of the opinion that plaintiff has 
shown no expert evidence or testimony to demonstrate a causal 
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link between any negligence on the part of defendant Searle 
and plaintiff's injuries. Thus summary judgment is appro-
priate. 
For the reasons hereinabove stated Summary Judgment 
against plaintiff and in favor of defendant Searle is 
confirmed and granted. The proposed judgment heretofore 
submitted by counsel for said defendant has been signed 
this date. 
The proposed Order denying plaintiff's motion for 
relief from judgment or Order heretofore submitted by counsel 
for said defendant has likewise been signed this date. 
The proposed Order denying plaintiff's Motion for 
Extension of Time in which to Answer Defendant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment as to Searle Pharmaceutical heretofore 
submitted by counsel for said defendant is refused and is 
returned to counsel herewith unsigned. 
Dated this $7 ^ day of January 1988. 
BY THE COURT: 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DEBRA KING, et al., 
Plaintiffs, CASE NUMBER: 70,361 
vs. DATE: JANUARY 27, 1988 
DORAN V. PORTER, et al., CULLEN Y. CHRISTENSEN, JUDGE 
Defendants. 
PROOF OF MAILING 
I, Sandra Starley, being first duly sworn according to 
law, upon oath, depose and say: that I am a citizen of the 
United States of America, over the age of twenty-one years; that 
on the 27th day of January, 1986, I deposited in the United 
States Post Office at Provo, Utah, enclosed in sealed envelopes 
with first-class postage fully prepaid theron, true copies of 
said ruling to the following to-wit: 
Wayne B. Watson 
Terri C. Bingham 
WATSON, SEILER & OREHOSKI 
2696 N. University Ave, Suite 220 
Provo, Utah 84604 
J. Anthony Eyre 
KIPP & CHRISTIAN, P.C. 
175 East 400 South, Suite 330 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
David W. Slagle 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
P.O. Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Dated this 27th day of January, 1988 
LA,- AU>-
